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INTRODUCTION
Contractual agreements requiring a supplier to deal exclusive-
ly with a single distributor frequently serve as the foundation for
business distribution systems. Antitrust law rarely questions the
legality of such exclusive dealing agreements, which often create
market efficiencies at both the supplier and distributor levels.
However, when exclusive dealing has as its purpose or effect the
elimination of actual or potential competitors from the market, it
falls squarely within the reach of the antitrust laws. This potential
both to create efficiencies and to inhibit natural competitive forces
has proven problematic for courts interpreting antitrust law and
applying it to exclusive dealing arrangements.
The primary goal of antitrust law, as articulated both by Con-
gress' and by the courts,2 is the promotion of competition in the
marketplace. Congress's original intent in enacting the Sherman
Act3 was the elimination of business combinations and other re-
straints of trade that created monopoly.4 Yet antitrust law toler-
ates monopoly that results from legitimate, competitive business
1. "[T]he object aimed at by this bill [the Sherman Act] is to secure competition of
the productions of different States which necessarily enter into interstate and foreign
commerce." 21 CONG. REc. S2462 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
2. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386-87
(1956); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); United States v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
4. 21 CONG. REc. S2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). Since the original
legislation was passed, however, courts have exercised their judicial authority to expand
the Act's scope to reach a much broader range of anticompetitive conduct. The Sherman
Act is recognized widely as a legislative command that the judiciary develop a common
law of antitrust. Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DuKE LJ.
263, 269.
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practices. 5 The attempt to strike a balance between protecting
competition and encouraging individual "industrial liberty"6 has
led to contrasting views of antitrust law and policy.
Two primary and divergent ecofiomic views of antitrust have
emerged. The first view is premised on the assumption that in any
given industry, market forces eventually will erode artificial com-
petitive restraints and dilute the accumulation of market power by
private firms. The Chicago School embraces this idea.7 Proponents
of the Chicago School model would limit the scope of antitrust
law and policy to economic efficiency concerns and would eschew
protection of small businesses.' This limited scope, together with
the belief that public intervention usually is not required to pre-
serve competition in the marketplace, encourages courts to exam-
ine possible antitrust violations carefully only in extreme situations
that clearly lead to market inefficiencies.9 The Chicago School,
arguing that exclusive dealing generally is an efficient business
practice with procompetitive effects, disapproves of close judicial
scrutiny of exclusive dealing agreements and contends that courts
should treat such agreements permissively.'0
5. During Senate debate on the Sherman Act, Senator Sherman noted the impor-
tance of protecting legitimate business practices:
It is said that this bill [the Sherman Act] will interfere with lawful trade,
with the customary business of life. I deny it. It aims only at unlawful combi-
nations. It does not in the least affect combinations in aid of production where
there is free and fair competition. It is the right of every man to work, labor,
and produce in any lawful vocation and to transport his production on equal
terms and conditions and under like circumstances. This is industrial liberty and
lies at the foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges.
21 CONG. REc S2455 (1890).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANITrRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
8. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213,
215 (1985) ("The Chicago School model of antitrust policy dictates that allocative effi-
ciency as defined by the market should be the only goal of the antitrust laws."); BORK,
supra note 7, at 7 ("A consideration of the virtues appropriate to law as law demon-
strates that the only legitimate goal of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare.
Current law lacks these virtues precisely because the Supreme Court has introduced con-
flicting goals, the primary one being the survival or comfort of small business.").
9. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 933 (1979). Posner notes that "[b]y 1969 ... an orthodox Chicago position
(well represented in the writings of Robert Bork) had crystallized: only explicit price
fixing and very large horizontal mergers (mergers to monopoly) were worthy of serious
concern."
10. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 7, at 303 ("Exclusive dealing, being a form of vertical
integration, creates efficiencies and does not create restriction of output. It should,
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The second view is premised on a belief that private firms
often distort natural market forces and that public intervention
provides the appropriate cure for such distortion. This view recog-
nizes that the antitrust laws should be used to pursue social and
political goals other than efficiency, including the decentralization
of accumulations of private economic power and the protection of
consumers' freedom to make choices in an open market." Propo-
nents of this theory argue for closer judicial scrutiny of exclusivity
agreements utilized to bar entry, facilitate anticompetitive collusion
among firms, protect concentrated market power, or restrict entre-
preneurial opportunity. 2
Because exclusive dealing arrangements may have either pro-
or anticompetitive effects on market conditions, determining their
legality in any given situation is a difficult task. While the diver-
gent economic theories outlined above are useful in shaping analy-
sis of exclusive dealing cases, 3 case-specific factual inquiries are
required in order to reach results in accord with the purposes of
the antitrust laws. Courts therefore must move beyond a purely
theoretical model and reduce economic abstractions to a more
practical level in order to determine the proper application of
antitrust law and policy. Indeed, the true issue that arises in exclu-
sive dealing cases is legal, not economic: Does the defendant exer-
cise market power in a manner that antitrust law seeks to
avoid? 4 Consequently, the proper judicial approach to exclusive
dealing is defined most effectively within the framework of a spe-
therefore, generally be lawful."); POSNER, supra note 7, at 205 ("[I]t is unlikely that a
rational profit-maximizing firm will use exclusive dealing as a method of excluding a
competitor.").
11. See Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?
An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAT_ L. REV.
761, 781 (1983).
12. See Kurt A. Strasser, Antitrust Policy in Agreements for Distributor Exclusivity, 16
CONN. L. REV. 969, 997 (1984).
13. The use of economic theory in these judicial determinations, however, has been
the subject of wide debate. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Econom-
ics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (1986)
(discussing the debate over the role of economic analysis in judicial decisionmaking).
Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696 (1986)
(defending the use of Chicago School economics in decisionmaking) with Eleanor M. Fox,
Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1714 (1986) (criticizing Chicago School
economics analysis).
14. Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Non-
structural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 24-25 (1994).
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cific industry model, with a view toward the actual effects of ex-
clusivity arrangements on competition within that industry.
This Note suggests a feasible judicial approach to exclusive
dealing agreements by examining the competitive effects of exclu-
sive dealing within a single industry: the computerized ticket distri-
bution industry. An examination of the current controversy over
the use of exclusive dealing within that industry is useful in defin-
ing a judicial standard in two ways. First, the structure and opera-
tion of the industry demonstrate the actual, as opposed to the
theoretical, competitive effects of exclusive dealing in an industry
in which market power is concentrated. Second, the ticketing ser-
vice industry serves as an example of how exclusive dealing, in
practice, can harm competitive forces, and when public interven-
tion is required to promote or restore healthy competition. The
consequences of exclusive dealing in this particular industry dem-
onstrate why courts, in order to discern possible antitrust viola-
tions, must scrutinize exclusivity arrangements closely in any indus-
try in which market power is concentrated.
Part I of this Note describes the infrastructure and operation
of the computerized ticket distribution industry, which will serve
as an example of how economic theory applies to market realities.
Part II discusses basic economic theory and the possible pro- and
anticompetitive effects of exclusive dealing contracts. This Part
argues that an approach that contemplates an abstract model of
efficiency, but moves beyond such a model and closely scrutinizes
the actual anticompetitive effects of exclusive dealing is most likely
to yield results in accord with the purposes of the antitrust laws.
Part III then analyzes the historical judicial treatment of exclusive
dealing and recent enforcement trends that further support close,
case-specific judicial scrutiny of exclusive dealing agreements' ac-
tual effects on competition. After demonstrating how this frame-
work for analysis applies in the context of the ticket distribution
industry, Part IV concludes that public intervention is required to
curb anticompetitive business practices in that industry. This Part
also demonstrates that in order to detect antitrust violations in any
concentrated industry setting, courts must examine the use of
exclusive dealing closely whenever anticompetitive effects are
probable and market forces alone are unlikely to correct the situa-
tion.
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I. THE STRUCrURE AND OPERATION OF THE COMPUTERIZED
TICKET DISTRIBUTION INDUSTRY
The computerized ticketing service industry is useful as a
model because it displays actual market responses to exclusive
dealing by a single dominant firm. Moreover, it is an industry that
has led both disgruntled consumers and the government to ques-
tion the legality of specific business practices undertaken by a
powerful firm. Private plaintiffs have raised numerous claims
against the industry's dominant firm, alleging various antitrust
violations and demonstrating the actual impact exclusive dealing
has on consumers. 5 Public enforcement agencies also have taken
an interest in industry practices. 6 The state of competition within
this industry illustrates the potential threat posed by exclusive
dealing arrangements and shows why close judicial scrutiny of such
arrangements is required to eliminate the concentration of market
power and, ultimately, to protect consumers.
The dominant firm in the ticketing service industry is
Ticketmaster. According to private plaintiffs,'7 Ticketmaster at-
tained its controlling position in the market through acquisitions of
questionable legality and maintains its position by entering into
unlawful exclusive dealing contracts with venues' 8 and event pro-
moters." By binding a large portion of the available venues and
15. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Telemarketing Company Charged with Anticompetitive Con-
duct, 68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 449 (Apr. 6, 1995); Sands v. Ticketmaster-
New York, 616 N.Y.S.2d 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Reynolds v. Bay Area Seating
Serv., Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19282 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1992).
16. In 1994, the Department of Justice commenced an investigation into business
practices in the industry. On July 5, 1995, the Antitrust Division closed its year-long
investigation into Ticketmaster's contracting practices without taking further action. Di-
vision Drops Investigation of Practices by Ticketmaster, 69 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 32 (July 13, 1995). In its statement, however, the Division warned that it would
"continue to monitor competitive developments in the ticketing industry." Id. Apparently,
the decision to drop the investigation was made on the grounds that new entry into the
market would counteract Ticketmaster's alleged anticompetitive activities. Id. However, no
evidence of such entry has come to light.
17. For a factual examination of the allegations against Ticketmaster, see infra Part
IV.
18. The venues that maintain contracts with Ticketmaster are typically large stadiums
and arenas that host major entertainment events. This detail is important in defining the
relevant market in which Ticketmaster operates. See infra text accompanying notes
126-29.
19. In MovieFone, Inc. v. Ticketmaster Corp. (S.D.N.Y. March 17, 1995) (unpub-
lished opinion), for example, the plaintiffs alleged that Ticketmaster acquired a 50%
interest in the nation's largest supplier of automated box office services, with whom
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promoters to exclusive dealing agreements, the firm allegedly
denies actual and potential competitors access to the market and
thereby suppresses natural competitive forces. These exclusivity
arrangements represent both the mainstay of Ticketmaster's busi-
ness operations and the crux of allegations of illegal business prac-
tices by the firm. °
The structure of the ticketing service industry is an important
consideration in evaluating the impact of exclusive dealing ar-
rangements on competition within the industry. Ticketing service
companies serve essentially as distributors of a supplier's (venue's
and promoter's) product-that is, tickets to see entertainment
events. The industry provides a service designed to enhance conve-
nience to the consumer-purchasers of these tickets: Computerized
ticket distribution allows consumers to buy tickets at local outlets
and over the telephone, and to avoid waiting in long lines at a
venue's box office. The ticketing company derives its revenues
from a service charge added to the price of each ticket."' When a
plaintiffs originally had a contract for the provision of computerized ticketing services. By
acquiring this interest, Ticketmaster was able to exercise management control over the
company and abrogated the 1992 contract with the plaintiffs. As a result, the plaintiffs
were unable to enter the market for the sale of tickets to large-scale entertainment
events. See Ticketmaster Teleticketing Company Charged, supra note 15. -The plaintiffs
further alleged that over a 10-year period, Ticketmaster has acquired 14 actual or poten-
tial competitors. Id.
20. Plaintiffs have alleged violations of both federal and state antitrust laws against
Ticketmaster under a variety of theories. See Kevin E. Stem, The High Cost of Conve-
nience: Antitrust Law Violations in the Computerized Ticketing Services Industry, 16
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 349, 358 (1994). Allegations include conspiracy to fix
prices, conspiracy to raise prices to finance illegal rebate schemes, and the illegal exercise
of monopoly power. See id.; Robert Nolin, Should the Nation's Courts Scalp
Ticketmaster?, THE RECORDER, July 21, 1994, at 3. This Note, however, will focus on
Ticketmaster's alleged use of exclusive dealing contracts to restrain trade unreasonably in
violation of § I of the Sherman Act. Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1994).
Exclusive dealing also may be analyzed as an exclusionary practice used to
maintain a monopoly. Section 2 of the Sherman Act punishes "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce. ... 15 U.S.C. § 2. The
importance of framing the issue as a § 2 claim as opposed to a § 1 claim may be in the
remedy., a § 2 claim of monopoly could result in dissolution of the firm, while a success-
ful § I claim would result in a conduct remedy, for example, shorter duration for con-
tracts. Although some plaintiffs have raised § 2 monopoly claims against Ticketmaster,
the precise issues involved in evaluating these claims are beyond the scope of this Note.
21. See Stem, supra note 20, at 350. Service charges vary according to the particular
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ticketing service company contracts with a venue to distribute its
tickets, the consumer can avoid paying these additional charges
only by circumventing the ticketing company completely and pur-
chasing a ticket directly at a venue box office.'
Ticketing service companies do not compete directly for
consumers' business. Instead, they compete to secure contracts
with venues and event promoters for the right to sell tickets to
various entertainment events. Ticketing companies generally make
fixed payments to venues and promoters in exchange for the right
to sell tickets; these companies also may provide additional incen-
tives to enter into such contracts by giving venues and promoters
a percentage of the service charges paid by consumers' Industry
contracts generally grant the ticketing company the exclusive right
to sell tickets off-site24 for all events sponsored by the venue or
promoter, precluding the venue or promoter from using any other
ticketing services for the duration of the contracts. These contracts
typically last a term of three to five years.z Exclusivity clauses
form the primary foundations for the relationship between ticket
distributors and their suppliers.'
Exclusive dealing arrangements have created a unique infra-
structure within the ticketing service industry that has prompted
consumers to question the legality of Ticketmaster's business prac-
tices. The primary concern is that exclusive dealing contracts un-
reasonably restrain the supply of inputs (venues' tickets and
promoters' services) available to rival ticketing service companies,
thereby giving Ticketmaster power to raise prices in the output
market (ticket sales to consumers)Y Specifically, consumers have
event, facility, and method of purchase; these fees can increase the price of a ticket by
20% to 44% of the original face value. Id. at 353.
22. Id. at 353.
23. See Nolin, supra note 20, at 3.
24. The venue typically retains the right to sell its own tickets from the box office at
the location of the venue itself. However, venue sales arrangements can vary, and tickets
often sell out over the telephone before the box office opens for sales. See infra text
accompanying notes 131-32.
25. See Nolin, supra note 20, at 3 (reporting a three-year contract between
Ticketmaster and the Centroplex, an arena in Orlando, Florida, and a five-year contract
between Ticketmaster and the West Palm Beach Auditorium); Anthony Ramirez,
Ticketmaster's Mr. Tough Guy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at Cl (referring to a five-year
contract between Ticketmaster and Meadowlands arena in New Jersey).
26. See Stem, supra note 20, at 353 ("The foundation of the computerized ticketing
service business is the exclusive dealing agreement.").
27. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Rais-
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alleged that Ticketmaster's exclusive dealing arrangements fore-
close access by other ticketing companies to a large percentage of
the venues and promoters necessary to hold major entertainment
events.28 Consumers contend that by unreasonably excluding actu-
al and potential competitors from a necessary source of demand
for their services, Ticketmaster increases its market power.29 This
conduct erodes competitive forces and allows Ticketmaster to
exercise greater control over prices in the market and to raise
ticket service charges to exorbitant amounts.
Consumers also have questioned Ticketmaster's practice of
inducing promoters and venues to enter into exclusive contracts by
sharing a percentage of the service charges with them.3 This
ing Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 224 (1986). Labelling
ticketing service companies as distributors, and venues and promoters as suppliers may be
a somewhat artificial construction. Exclusive dealing may refer both to contracts that
require a distributor to deal solely with a single supplier and to contracts that restrict a
supplier to a single distributor. Some commentators have treated the costs and benefits
associated with these two categories of exclusive dealing separately. See Strasser, supra
note 12, at 970-71. However, Krattenmaker and Salop demonstrate that the difference is
not relevant to the analysis of anticompetitive exclusion: "To assess claims of
anticompetitive exclusion, the proper question is not which firm is a buyer and which a
seller, but whether one (or both) is the purchaser of an exclusionary right that raises
rivals' costs and gives the purchaser power over price in its market." Krattenmaker &
Salop, supra at 226. This Note analyzes exclusive dealing as a general category of
exclusionary conduct.
28. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 20, at 358-59 (discussing California plaintiffs' allega-
tions of Ticketmaster's violations of state antitrust laws, including restraint of trade and
unreasonable foreclosure of competitors); see also Memorandum from Pearl Jam to the
Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Justice Concerning Anticompetitive Actions Engaged
in by Ticketmaster Holdings Group Ltd. 11-12 (May 6, 1994) (on file with author) (al-
leging that Ticketmaster's enforcement of exclusive dealing agreements forecloses access
to "a significant percentage of the suppliers of services necessary to hold entertainment
events").
29. Market power may be defined simply as the ability to control prices or exclude
competitors. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
391 (1956).
30. See Stern, supra note 20, at 358 (discussing plaintiffs' allegation that Ticketmaster
has made payments of "secret rebates" to venues and promoters in order to attain exclu-
sive dealing contracts). Critics have referred to this practice as providing "kickbacks." See
Laurie P. Cohen, A White Shoe Firm, a Rock Band, and a Threat, WALL ST. J., July 29,
1994, at B1. This practice is not in itself a basis for antitrust liability; indeed, it may be
a legitimate form of price competition that simply reflects the price the ticketing compa-
ny is willing to pay for the exclusivity agreement. However, while this may be true in
theory, the practice may, in effect, facilitate Ticketmaster's dominant position and its
ability to raise prices to supracompetitive levels. See Stern, supra note 20, at 354 ("Since
the agreements are exclusive, the ticketing service is able to finance this fee-splitting
scheme by charging higher convenience fees to the public without fear of losing busi-
ness.").
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practice allegedly thwarts other ticketing service companies' efforts
to compete with the incumbent firm, potentially injuring the busi-
ness of competitors and making entry by new firms extremely dif-
ficult.31 Moreover, the practice of sharing a portion of service
charges raises questions about the venues' and promoters' actual
motives for entering into exclusive arrangements. Revenue-sharing
gives these entities a vested interest in Ticketmaster's efforts to
raise service charges."
These business practices warrant especially close scrutiny when
considered in the context of an industry reality: the indisputable
dominance of Ticketmaster in the market for ticket sales.33 Tick-
etmaster has no real competitors on a national scale. Since the
acquisition of the assets of its only national competitor, Ticketron,
in 1991,' only small regional distributors independently market
tickets.' The nationwide predominance of a single firm in the
ticketing service industry is sufficient in itself to raise suspicions
concerning the legality of its exclusivity arrangements, and, more
generally, the vitality of competition in the industry.3 6
31. During the 1980s, Ticketmaster reportedly was successful in luring business away
from Ticketron, a major national rival, largely by promising venues and promoters a
greater percentage of service charges. See Stern, supra note 20, at 354-55. Ticketmaster
eventually acquired a majority of Ticketron's assets in 1991; the inevitable result was an
increase in service fees for tickets. See id.
32. The issue of venue and promoter conduct is primarily relevant with respect to
claims brought under a theory of conspiracy to monopolize under § 2 of the Sherman
Act. However, their motives also may have an impact on the analysis of vertical re-
straints of trade under § 1. See infra text accompanying notes 173-74.
33. See Nolin, supra note 20, at 3 (reporting that Ticketmaster is "by far the largest
distributor of tickets in the United States," with sales of 52 million tickets for a face
value of $1.3 billion and revenues of $190 million in 1993).
34. The Justice Department swiftly approved Ticketmaster's 1991 buyout of
Ticketron, despite protests by numerous consumer groups, reportedly on the basis of the
"failing firm" doctrine. See Stern, supra note 20, at 356 n.37. The three requirements of
this doctrine are
(1) [t]he allegedly failing firm probably would be unable to meet its financial
obligations in the near future; (2) it probably would not be able to reorganize
successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act; and (3) it has made un-
successful good faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers of acquisi-
tion . . . that would both keep it in the market and pose a less severe danger
to competition than the proposed merger.
U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines-1984, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,103,
at 20,567 (1988). Ordinarily, a firm must be in "critical condition" to pass this test. See
United States v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659, 673 n.24 (9th Cir. 1990).
35. See Stem, supra note 20, at 355.
36. The primary threat exclusive dealing poses to competitors is its potential to ex-
clude competitors and thereby increase market power. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
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II. THE COMPETITIVE EFFEcrs OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING
One type of exclusive dealing occurs when a firm contracts
with a supplier for the supplier's agreement not to deal with the
purchasing firm's competitors. 7 Although both courts and com-
mentators have scrutinized the use of exclusive dealing arrange-
ments, they recognize that such arrangements are utilized widely
and have the potential to promote competition as well as to sup-
press it.' Analysis of both the pro- and anticompetitive effects of
exclusivity agreements demonstrates how economic theory applies
in the context of an actual industry setting and why a detailed
factual inquiry into actual competitive effects is necessary.
A. Potential Procompetitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing Arrange-
ments
Exclusive dealing often serves as a benign method for facili-
tating distribution, yielding benefits both to the businesses in-
volved and to the consumer. Exclusive dealing potentially minimiz-
es the cost and risk of conducting business in uncertain markets,
which, in turn, increases operating efficiencies and decreases costs
to the consumer.3 9 In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,40 the
leading case on exclusive dealing contracts, the Supreme Court de-
scribed a number of ways in which exclusive dealing facilitates
distribution and minimizes costs and risks. The Court stated that
exclusive dealing contracts
may well be of economic advantage to buyers as well as to sell-
ers, and thus indirectly of advantage to the consuming public. In
the case of the buyer, they may assure supply, afford protection
against rises in price, enable long-term planning on the basis of
known costs, and obviate the expense and risk of storage in the
quantity necessary for a commodity having a fluctuating demand.
From the seller's point of view, [they] may make possible the
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 595 (1st Cir. 1993); see also infra text accompanying
notes 136-58. A firm's possession of a significant amount of market power, coupled with
the use of exclusive dealing contracts, suggests that the firm's dominance is the result of
restrictive exclusive dealing arrangements, not natural market forces.
37. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 27, at 215.
38. See, e.g., Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1960); Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) [hereinafter Standard Stations];
Strasser, supra note 12, at 972-74.
39. See Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 306; see also Strasser, supra note 12, at 969.
40. 337 U.S. 293 (1949). The case is commonly referred to as Standard Stations.
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substantial reduction of selling expenses, give protection against
price fluctuations, and.. . offer the possibility of a predictable
market.41
When exclusive dealing reduces costs and facilitates distribution in
this manner, it creates market efficiencies that confer benefits to
the ultimate consumer.42
A primary benefit of exclusive dealing contracts is a reduction
in transaction costs. By entering into long-term contracts, both the
supplier and the distributor are able to avoid the expense of
reaching a new agreement for each individual transaction in a
business relationship. In the ticketing service industry, for example,
venues and ticketing companies are spared the costs of making
arrangements for each entertainment event. Venues are able to
simplify and facilitate ticket distribution by utilizing only a single
source for tickets, and ticketing companies are spared the uncer-
tainty, and consequently the cost, of obtaining an assured supply
of entertainment events.43 Moreover, exclusive dealing may lower
transaction costs and facilitate distribution simply by building a
positive relationship between the parties to the exclusive arrange-
ment-promoting trust, loyalty, and the exchange of informa-
tion.44
Exclusive dealing contracts also may allow businesses to cir-
cumvent the additional costs of free-riding by other firms.45 The
problems of free-riding may be explained as follows:
Exclusive dealing is sometimes needed to ensure that the benefits
generated by a capital investment in a particular brand of a
product accrue to the party making that investment. In the ab-
41. Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 306-07 (citation omitted). The Court here Was de-
scribing requirements contracts, which are contracts that provide that a buyer will pur-
chase all of its needed supply from the seller. For the purposes of this Note, require-
ments contracts and exclusive dealing are analytically identical.
42. See id, at 306.
43. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 27, at 228-29.
44. Strasser, supra note 12, at 973 (noting that exclusivity may successfully "creat[e]
an identity of interest between supplier and distributor").
45. A recent case, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., 504 U.S. 451
(1992), see infra text accompanying notes 99-109, provides an example of how free-riding
might serve as a justification for exclusive dealing. Kodak maintained exclusivity agree-
ments with parts suppliers with whom Kodak necessarily shared technological information.
Arguably, exclusivity provided a means for Kodak to prevent the unauthorized disclosure
of information to its competitors, and thus to prevent competitors from free-riding by
taking advantage of such technology.
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sence of exclusive dealing, competing brands can free-ride on
certain types of capital investments and thereby reduce or de-
stroy the incentive to make such investments. Both consumer
welfare and competitive processes can thereby be harmed.'
In order to justify the use of exclusive dealing contracts, firms thus
may argue that exclusivity is necessary to eliminate potential free-
riders. Although this argument is persuasive, less restrictive alter-
natives for avoiding the costs associated with free-riding frequently
exist.47
B. Potential Anticompetitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing
Although the potential procompetitive effects of exclusive
dealing should not be ignored, exclusive dealing arrangements can
have serious anticompetitive effects as well. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit identified in U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc.4 the primary danger that exclusive dealing pos-
es to competition: "[Ain exclusive arrangement may 'foreclose' so
much of the available supply or outlet capacity that existing com-
petitors or new entrants may be limited or excluded and, under
certain circumstances, this may reinforce market power and raise
prices for consumers."4 9 The primary concern, then, is that exclu-
sive dealing (a) will foreclose existing competitors, and (b) will
erect entry barriers to deter potential competitors, thereby harming
the ultimate consumer.'
Foreclosure of existing competitors occurs when, for example,
an exclusive dealing contract provides that certain suppliers are to
transact only with a single distributor; competitors of that supplier
thereby are foreclosed from the demand represented by the con-
tracting suppliers for the term of the contract. All contractual
agreements result in some degree of foreclosure because a certain
amount of demand necessarily disappears from the market when
any contract is formed. Antitrust law is not concerned with this
46. GREGG FRASCO, EXCLUSIVE DEAuNG: A COMPREHENSIVE CASE STUDY 4
(1991).
47. An example of a less restrictive alternative is a contractual term requiring confi-
dentiality of technological or proprietary information exchanged between the supplier and
distributor.
48. 986 F.2d 589 (lst Cir. 1993).
49. Id. at 595.
50. See Strasser, supra note 12, at 984.
51. See FRASCO, supra note 46, at 15.
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minimal foreclosure. It is concerned, however, with the possibility
that effective foreclosure of a substantial amount of the market
will have a negative impact on competition by increasing market
power and by enhancing the ability of incumbent firms to raise
prices to supracompetitive levels. Substantial market foreclosure is
"one of the primary anticompetitive effects with which antitrust
courts have been concerned."' 2
Many commentators have argued that effective foreclosure
never can occur because exclusive dealing arrangements that tie up
a large number of suppliers simply create demand for new supplier
resources. This prompts new firms to enter the market and to pro-
vide a needed supply for the distributor's competitors (actual and
potential), thereby enhancing competition. 3 Advocates of this
view further contend that exclusivity does not result in distributors'
ability to raise prices to supracompetitive levels in the output
market because competition for the business of the supplier firms
will itself keep prices at a competitive level.' However, these
arguments ignore the anticompetitive effects of entry barriers,
which exclusive dealing often builds and maintains as a bar to
effective competition.
An "entry barrier" is any market condition that allows an
incumbent firm to raise prices while deterring outsiders from en-
tering the market55 Exclusive dealing agreements erect entry bar-
52. Strasser, supra note 12, at 986. Strasser further notes two characteristics of exclu-
sive dealing arrangements that are particularly conducive to market foreclosure. First,
such agreements directly restrict competitors' access to certain suppliers or distributors.
Second, such agreements tend to tie up the most efficient suppliers or distributors first,
leaving only those of lesser quality and of lesser effectiveness available to competitors.
See iL at 986-87. For further discussion of foreclosure see infra text accompanying notes
144-66.
53. See BORK, supra note 7, at 299-309; FRASCO, supra note 46, at 15-17; Strasser,
supra note 12, at 987 (citing authorities).
54. See FRASCO, supra note 46, at 15-17. Frasco explains the argument as follows:
"Supracompetitive pricing in the output market by [distributors] implies that existing
rivals or entrants in the output market can offer existing and/or potential input suppliers
a better deal. Hence entry would tend to take place in the output market and output
prices would tend to fall." Id. at 17.
55. The term "entry barrier," actually has been defined in various, sometimes con-
trasting ways. For example, Joe Bain defines entry barriers as a measure of the extent to
which an established firm is able to "elevate [its] prices above the minimized or com-
petitive average costs of production and distribution" without "inducing new sellers to
enter the industry." JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 237 (1959). In contrast,
George Stigler defines entry barriers as production costs "which must be borne by a firm
which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry."
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riers by increasing the costs of entry and reducing the opportunity
for potential competitors to gain access to a needed supply.56 As
a result, exclusive dealing contracts may preserve or augment the
market power of incumbent firms and create an anticompetitive
business environment.-5
The final results of foreclosure and entry barriers are higher
costs to the consumer and, in extreme cases, a lack of any real
freedom to choose which products she will purchase. In the ticket-
ing service industry, for example, market foreclosure allegedly has
forced consumers to purchase tickets through a single distributor
and to pay that distributor's inflated price. 8 Commentators have
noted that the "protection of the freedom of buyers to make
uncoerced choices in an unrestricted market was a primary concern
of Congress '59 in enacting antitrust legislation and is "a funda-
mental policy in distributor exclusivity cases."'  Moreover, the Su-
preme Court expressly recognized the importance of this freedom
in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co." Therefore, in the absence of compel-
ling and demonstrable efficiency justifications, antitrust law recog-
nizes that exclusive dealing arrangements result in foreclosure and
entry barriers that in turn ultimately harm the consumer.62
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968). Professor Hovenkamp
notes that most antitrust analysis focuses primarily on the "Bainian" rather than the
"Stiglerian" approach to entry barriers. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETIrION AND ITS PRACTCE 40 (1994). But see In re Echlin
Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410, 483-87 (1985). This distinction is subtle; the simple definition
used in the text is sufficient for an understanding of the present discussion.
56. See In re Beltone Electronics Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 197-218 (1982).
57. See id. Entry barriers will be discussed in greater detail infra Section IV (C).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
59. Strasser, supra note 12, at 992.
60. Id. See also Baddia J. Rashid, Antitrust Aspects of Exclusive Dealing Arrange-
ments, 40 GEO. LJ. 241, 254-56 (1952).
61. 384 U.S. 316 (1966). The Court determined that the practice at issue was at odds
with "the central policy of both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act
against contracts which take away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market." Id.
at 321.
62. See Strasser, supra note 12, at 992. Strasser argues that the goal of providing
uncoerced choices is "not a useful analytical concept for deciding distributor exclusivity
cases." ld. The present discussion does not purport to utilize consumer freedom as an
analytical tool; lack of freedom is recognized here simply as the unfortunate result of
anticompetitive market forces.
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C. The Debate over the Proper Treatment of Exclusive Dealing
Arrangements
Two basic, divergent views of antitrust law generally and
exclusive dealing specifically have evolved. The first approach
would treat exclusive agreements as presumptively legal.63 The
Chicago School advocates this position, focusing primarily on the
procompetitive effects of exclusivity and other categories of verti-
cal restraints.' This extreme approach relies heavily on pure eco-
nomic theory65 and assumes that market processes eventually will
erode privately imposed competitive restraints and market pow-
er.' Chicagoans argue that market forces alone usually can
achieve coordination in distribution at the least cost.67 Such strict
analysis, however, often fails to take into account actual market
conditions or to recognize that economic models must account for
market imperfections: "[M]arkets do not always coordinate transac-
tions or minimize costs perfectly."'  Any theory that ignores actu-
al variations from ideal market conditions inevitably leads to inac-
63. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as
Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost
Economics, and Organization Theory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1014 (1983).
64. Advocates of this view further argue that "vertical restraints are merely a catego-
ry of generic business practices that may enhance economic efficiency through a partial
suppression of market forces. The efficiency-enhancing aspects of these business practices
indicate that a proper antitrust policy should incorporate a strong, yet rebuttable, pre-
sumption of their legality." Ld.
65. Judge Posner has argued: "Casual observation of business behavior, colorful char-
acterizations (such as the term "barrier to entry"), eclectic forays into sociology and psy-
chology, descriptive statistics, and verification by plausibility [have taken] the place of the
careful definitions and parsimonious logical structure of economic theory." Posner, supra
note 9, at 929.
66. The idea that market forces alone will expunge anticompetitive behavior, howev-
er, stands in direct contrast to the purpose of the original enactment of antitrust laws:
The Sherman Act reflects a policy that we are unwilling to wait for the cure. See Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General, 1995 Revisions to the Vertical Restraints Guide-
lines, in 68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 409, 435 (1995).
67. See Strasser, supra note 12, at 969 (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS (R. Campbell et al. eds., 1981)).
Also fundamental to Chicago school thinking is a distrust of the ability of the legal
system to correct perceived competitive harms and in the courts' capacity to distinguish
antitrust law from policy preferences, without focusing on efficiency concerns. For a use-
ful discussion of the efficacy of the legal system in antitrust, see Thomas C. Arthur, The
Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1994).
68. Strasser, supra note 12, at 969.
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curate results in interpretation and application of the antitrust laws.69
The opposing view advocates close scrutiny of potentially
anticompetitive business practices, including exclusivity arrange-
ments, on grounds that incumbent firms do not require the sup-
port of severe distribution restraints and that less restrictive alter-
natives are frequently available." This view, generally premised
on the theory that markets are delicate and prone to distortion by
individual firms, contends that public intervention is the appropri-
ate remedy for such problems.7 Although proponents of this ap-
proach recognize that exclusive dealing can in fact lead to more
efficient and cost-effective distribution of goods by allowing a
distributor to coordinate transactions herself,72 they also argue
that exclusive dealing should be prohibited when it is used to fore-
close actual or potential competitors, protect market power, or
restrict entrepreneurial opportunity.73
The argument that competition is never harmed by exclusive
dealing74 tends to ignore or dismiss the theoretical and, more im-
portantly, the actual anticompetitive effects of exclusivity arrange-
ments. Chicago School economic theory mandates that the anti-
trust laws protect only efficiency;75 at times, the Supreme Court
has followed this approach and has failed to balance economic
theory with antitrust policy.76 A theory that holds efficiency to be
the sole purpose of antitrust law overlooks the original intent
69. See Arthur, supra note 67, at 8 ("In short, the [perfect competition] model leaves
out the factors which provide for economic progress. These factors . . . must be kept in
mind if antitrust regulation is to reach sensible results.").
70. See In re Beltone Electronics Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 205 (1982).
71. See id.
72. See Strasser, supra note 12, at 969.
73. See id. at 997.
74. See Butler & Baysinger, supra note 63, at 1087-88.
75. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
76. A prime example of the Supreme Court's willingness to accept Chicago School
economics is Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-56 (1977), in
which the Court, citing both Richard Posner and Robert Bork, overruled a per se rule
against non-price vertical restraints. See also Lawrence T. Festa, III, Comment, Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: The Decline and Fall of the Chicago Em-
pire?, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 619, 621-22 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision in Sylvania). In Sylvania, "the Court based its decision on the theory that non-
price vertical restraints are necessary to prevent free-riding on [the defendant's] pre-sale
services, without demanding evidence of the provision of these services or the incidence
of free-riding in the absence of the restraints." Joseph Kattan, Economic Theory as a
Substitute for Evidence in Antitrust: The Difficulty of Erecting Rules of Law on Theory
After Kodak, 23 ANTrrRUST LAW & ECON. REv. 13, 24 (1991).
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behind the enactment of the earlier antitrust legislation: decentral-
izing concentrated market power and providing the consumer with
competitive price, output, quality, and diversity of goods available
in the market.' These ideals should not be ignored in interpret-
ing and applying the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court recently has indicated that it has not fully
embraced a strict, Chicago-school theory of antitrust." Moreover,
the Court recently has lent support to the use of an approach that
focuses on economic realities and factual predicates.79 Future
courts addressing exclusive dealing arrangements therefore should
permit firms to proffer efficiency justifications in defense of exclu-
sivity, but should not assume the existence of procompetitive ef-
fects in the absence of demonstrable market efficiencies. When
proffered business justifications are weak, or when firms fail to
present evidence that their exclusive contracts are used solely to
reduce costs or prevent free-riding, courts should not dismiss
claims alleging antitrust violations. Analysis of actual competitive
effects, not simply mechanical application of theoretical economic
models, is required in order to construct a framework for exclusive
dealing that serves the purposes of the antitrust laws. The ticketing
service industry provides a factual setting that is conducive to such
construction.
III. HISTORICAL JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING
AND RECENT ENFORCEMENT TRENDS
The starting point for analysis of exclusive dealing cases is the
Supreme Court's decision in Standard Stations, in which the Court
utilized a "quantitative substantiality" test to evaluate the legality
of exclusivity agreements.' This test focuses singularly on the
77. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
78. See Festa, supra note 76, at 620.
79. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992)
(citing cases); see also infra Section III.
80. 337 U.S. at 299 (1948). This case was decided under § 3 of the Clayton Act. 38
Stat. 730 § 3 (1913), which provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities . . . where the effect of
such lease, sale, or contract for sale of such condition, agreement or under-
standing may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopo-
ly in any line of commerce.
102519961
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
degree of foreclosure in the relevant line of commerce as the basis
for an antitrust violation. The Court concluded that on the facts
before it,8l the statutory requirement of proof-that the likely ef-
fect of defendant's exclusive agreements was to "substantially
lessen competition"-could be met by proof that a substantial por-
tion of commerce was in fact affected.' The Court did not re-
quire any factual demonstration of additional factors likely to
impact competition negatively, such as the number and strength of
other competitors in the industry, or the presence of barriers to
entry. 3 Under this analysis, the assessment of actual or probable
competitive effects beyond a numerical measure of market share is
irrelevant.
The Supreme Court properly retreated from this position in
subsequent decisions. More recent cases have looked beyond sim-
ple market foreclosure to examine the actual or probable
anticompetitive effects of exclusive dealing arrangements. Tampa
Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.4 altered the analysis of exclu-
sive dealing arrangements by focusing on qualitative factors in
evaluating possible antitrust violations, developing a three-pronged
inquiry for evaluating exclusivity arrangements. First, courts must
determine the relevant line of commerce (i.e., the types of prod-
ucts or services involved) "on the basis of the facts peculiar to the
case." Second, courts must carefully define the relevant geo-
graphic market and evaluate the degree of foreclosure in terms of
this market.' Finally, courts must determine whether the exclu-
The analysis under this section is almost identical to § 1 of the Sherman Act. See BORK,
supra note 7, at 299 ("The law deals with [exclusive dealing] contracts under Section 3 of
the Clayton Act.. .and Section I of the Sherman Act, which ...has come to apply
doctrine distinguishable from the doctrine of Clayton 3 only by a metaphysician."),
Ticketmaster's practices, however, are unassailable under the Clayton Act because they
involve a service, not a "commodity." See Kennedy Theater Ticket Serv. v. Ticketron, 342
F. Supp. 922, 927 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("[Slince the intangible aspects of the admission tickets
are dominant over the tangible aspects thereof, an admission ticket does not constitute a
'commodity' within the meaning of the [Clayton] Act.").
81. The defendant in Standard Stations owned gasoline refineries and sold petroleum
products under exclusive supply contracts with independent service stations constituting
1.6% of the retail gasoline outlets in the area. Total sales under exclusive agreements
amounted to 6.7% of the total gallonage sold in the entire market that year. Standard
Stations, 337 U.S. at 295.
82. I& at 299, 314.
83. Id. Barriers to entry will be discussed infra text accompanying notes 159-71.
84. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
85. Id. at 327.
86. Id.
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sive dealing contracts constitute a "substantial share" of the rele-
vant market.87
In evaluating the "substantiality" of the market foreclosure in
any given case, the Court reasoned that
it is necessary to weigh the probable effect of the contract on the
relevant area of effective competition, taking into account the
relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of com-
merce involved .. and the probable immediate and future ef-
fects which pre-emption of that share of the market might have
on effective competition therein.88
This analysis represents a less rigid approach than the standard
articulated in Standard Stations. In Tampa Electric, the Court fo-
cused on the actual impact of the exclusive agreements on compe-
tition in the coal market; a significant percentage of foreclosure
was not sufficient to subject a firm to antitrust liability.89
The standard that has emerged, then, requires proof of sub-
stantial market foreclosure in addition to a demonstration of possi-
ble immediate and future effects on competition." Tampa Electric
further suggests that this analysis should be balanced against any
possible efficiencies or competitive benefits that result from the
exclusivity.9' This approach reflects an emphasis on the balancing
of qualitative factors; such a balancing approach has been labelled
the "rule of reason" standard and has been crucial in subsequent
analyses of exclusive dealing arrangements. 2
87. Id. at 328. The requirement of careful market definition was extremely important
in Tampa Electric. The Court defined the market very broadly, and as a result, ruled in
favor of the defendant on the basis that its share of the total coal market was less than
1% and that preemption of competition in fact did not tend to foreclose competition in
that market. Id. at 333.
88. Id. at 329.
89. d at 327-29 (analyzing the effects of the disputed contract on competition, in-
cluding numerous factors other than the percentage of foreclosure).
90. See id.; U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 597 (1st Cir.
1993).
91. See Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 334.
92. The rule of reason standard is perhaps most clearly stated in Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
The true test of legality [under Section 1 of the Sherman Act] is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable.
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The Supreme Court has not spoken directly on the legality of
exclusive dealing arrangements in over thirty years. The only guid-
ance that the Court has provided since Tampa Electric is through
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde.93 In that case, the majority assessed the
legality of an exclusive contract between a hospital and a firm of
anesthesiologists under a tying theory.9 The concurrence, howev-
er, argued that the arrangement should have been analyzed as an
exclusive dealing claim.9' O'Connor's opinion applies Tampa
Electric's rule of reason approach to exclusive dealing and provides
some support for the view that actual economic effects must be
taken into account in analyzing exclusive dealing contracts. 6
Id. at 238.
The alternative to this approach is a per se rule of illegality, which courts have
consistently refused to apply to exclusive dealing and most other forms of vertical re-
straints. "Per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that
is manifestly anticompetitive." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
49-50 (1977). A per se rule, however, is essentially a predetermined application of the
rule of reason to a category of conduct that tends to suppress or destroy competition. See
Marc A. Fajer, Taming the Wayward Children of Monsanto and Sylvania.: Some Thoughts
on Developmental Disorders in Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 68 TEMPLE L. REv. 1, 9
(1995) ("The rule of reason and per se analysis are but two methods of determining
whether a restraint is 'unreasonable,' i.e., whether its anticompetitive effects outweigh its
procompetitive effects.") (citing Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct.
1884, 1893 (1990)).
93. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
94. Tying occurs when a seller of product A conditions the purchase of A, the tying
product, on the purchase of product B, the tied product. See BORK, supra note 7, at 365.
At issue in Jefferson Parish was the validity of an exclusive contract between the defen-
dant hospital and a firm of anesthesiologists. The Fifth Circuit had ruled that the case
involved a tying arrangement because the "users of the hospital's operating rooms (the
tying product) are also compelled to purchase the hospital's chosen anesthesia service
(the tied product)." Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 8.
Tying arrangements are similar in nature to exclusive dealing arrangements in that
both impose vertical restraints on competition. However, courts have treated the two
practices differently, generally according much harsher treatment to tying practices.
95. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice
Rehnquist. This split as to the proper characterization of the case suggests that the deci-
sion may have an important impact on both tying and exclusive dealing law. See Richard
M. Steuer, Exclusive Dealing After Jefferson Parish, 54 ANTrTRUST LJ. 1229, 1229 (1985).
96. O'Connor reasoned that
[e]xclusive dealing is an unreasonable restraint on trade only when a significant
fraction of buyers or sellers are frozen out of a market by the exclusive deal.
When the sellers of services are numerous and mobile, and the number of
buyers is large, exclusive-dealing arrangements of narrow scope pose no threat
of adverse economic consequences.
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 45 (citations omitted). Consequently, O'Connor found that a
30% foreclosure in the situation before the Court did not foreclose a significant fraction
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Lower courts generally have followed Tampa Electric's ap-
proach, typically requiring proof of a significant negative impact on
competition in the relevant market in order to establish the illegal-
ity of an exclusivity agreement.' Once substantial foreclosure in
the relevant market is found, courts will examine the additional
factors articulated in the Tampa Electric opinion in evaluating
possible anticompetitive effects. Courts tend to look at numerous
market conditions in applying the rule of reason analysis, but focus
primarily on three factors emphasized in Tampa Electric: (1) the
percentage of the market foreclosed; (2) the ease of entry into the
defined market; and (3) the duration and terminability of the
exclusive contracts.98 In order to discover and punish anticompet-
itive conduct, courts should examine each of these factors carefully
in exclusive dealing cases.
The Supreme Court's decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Im-
age Technical Services, Inc.9 9 marks a significant recent develop-
ment in the course of judicial treatment of vertical restraints. Al-
though Eastman Kodak is a tying case, it has broad implications
for antitrust law and lends support to a judicial approach that
of the relevant market and therefore did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of
trade. Id. at 47.
The majority also emphasized the importance of actual economic effects in declining
to apply a per se rule to the arrangement. Id. at 29 (requiring the plaintiff to prove that
the contract unreasonably restrained competition, a burden that "necessarily involves an
inquiry into the actual effect of the exclusive contract on competition among anesthesiolo-
gists").
97. See, e.g., Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Serv., 823 F.2d 1215, 1233-34 (8th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988). See also Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.,
749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984). The Seventh Circuit noted:
Although the Supreme Court has not decided an exclusive-dealing case in many
years, it now appears most unlikely that such agreements ...will be judged by
the simple and strict test of Standard Stations. They will be judged under the
Rule of Reason, and thus condemned only if found to restrain trade unreason-
ably.
ld. at 393. Cf Strasser, supra note 12, at 970:
[T]he rule of reason has been given little analytical content because traditional
antitrust policy has reflected only an incomplete understanding of the workings
of vertical markets and vertical distribution systems as economic and commercial
phenomena. Consequently, these exclusivity agreements are uniformly permitted
with little or no analysis.
98. See, e.g., Virgin Atlantic Airways v. British Airways PLC, 872 F. Supp. 52, 66
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Barr Laboratories, Inc. v. Abbot Laboratories, 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,647, at 61,404 (D.NJ. 1989); Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 668 F. Supp. 861, 884
(D. Del. 1987).
99. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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analyzes actual competitive effects closely. Some commentators
have interpreted this decision as signalling the Supreme Court's
move away from analysis based on Chicago School economic theo-
ry and toward a more fact-intensive approach that results in closer
scrutiny of vertical restraints."
In Eastman Kodak, the plaintiffs were independent service
organizations (ISOs) claiming that the defendant's policy of limit-
ing the availability of replacement parts for its equipment harmed
them competitively. The plaintiffs argued that Kodak illegally tied
the sale of service for Kodak machines to the sale of parts;1"'
this policy allegedly made it difficult for the ISOs to compete with
Kodak in servicing Kodak equipment. Kodak's primary defense
was that it did not possess market power in the relevant mar-
ket-here, the parts and service aftermarket.y
Kodak urged the Court to adopt a substantive legal rule that
"equipment competition precludes any finding of monopoly power
in derivative aftermarkets."'' Dismissing Kodak's argument that
an examination of the facts was unnecessary when the issue was
market power in an aftermarket, the Court stated:
Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather
than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust
law. This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a
case-by-case basis, focusing on the "particular facts disclosed by
the record." ... In determining the existence of market pow-
er ... this Court has examined closely the economic reality of
the market at issue. 10 4
The Court, then, required a detailed factual inquiry and ultimately
denied the defendant summary judgment.' 5
The Eastman Kodak decision indicates that economic theory
alone cannot provide the basis for a successful antitrust de-
fense." The Court engaged in a thorough analysis of Kodak's
100. See, e.g., Festa, supra note 76, at 619; Kattan, supra note 76, at 13.
101. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 459.
102. Specifically, Kodak argued that because competition existed in the equipment
market, the possibility that it exercised market power in the service and parts markets
(the aftermarkets) "'simply makes no economic sense.'" Id. at 467 (quoting Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
103. Id. at 466 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 33).
104. Id. at 466-67 (quoting Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563,
579 (1925)).
105. Id. at 469, 477.
106. "In the least, it suggests that resort to pure economic theory in lieu of direct
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economic theory and of actual market effects. For example, Kodak
argued that higher service prices would lead to a "disastrous" drop
in equipment sales; at the same time, low service prices would
lead to an increase in equipment sales. The Court took Kodak's
argument one step further and noted that according to this theory,
Kodak would be expected to take advantage of lower-priced ISO
service to expand equipment sales."t 7 However, the Court found
that Kodak had instead adopted a restrictive sales policy designed
to eliminate lower-priced ISO service, an act expected to devastate
Kodak's equipment sales. 8 As expected, service prices for Ko-
dak customers increased, but no evidence existed of a correspond-
ing decrease in sales of Kodak equipment."° The Court thus
tested Kodak's proffered economic theory against actual market
responses; Kodak's theory could not survive such close scrutiny.
This decision suggests that future courts addressing vertical re-
straints should be reluctant to grant summary judgment to defen-
dants who claim their practices generally produce procompetitive
results without specific proof that actual procompetitive effects
outweigh any harm to competition.
In addition to judicial review of alleged antitrust violations,
enforcement by the United States Department of Justice is impor-
tant in preventing and redressing anticompetitive conduct. Several
recent developments in the policy of the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department indicate the direction in which antitrust en-
forcement is moving and suggest more meaningful ways to address
exclusive dealing. The current Assistant Attorney General for the
Antitrust Division, Anne Bingaman, recently has stated that the
Justice Department will subject exclusive dealing and other
nonprice vertical restraints to a "meaningful Rule of Reason analy-
sis.""' Bingaman has spoken directly on the Supreme Court's
decision in Eastman Kodak, interpreting the majority opinion in
that case as requiring more vigorous analysis into the facts of an
individual case before disposing of the claim on summary judg-
ment."' Moreover, the Justice Department's current policy is to
evidence may be a risky course for antitrust defendants." Kattan, supra note 76, at 20.
107. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 476.
108. itL
109. id.
110. Remarks of Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman to the ABA Anti-
trust Section, New York, NY, in 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,110, at 48,924 (Aug. 10,
1993) (emphasis added).
111. Nomination Hearing of Anne Bingaman to Be AssL Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div.,
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enforce the law vigorously, with fact-intensive inquiries into actual
competitive effects." 2 This approach does not ignore economic
theory; instead, it employs a balanced approach, "one that applies
sound theoretical analysis together with an appreciation that the
facts on occasion will not square with theory.', 13
The policies of the Justice Department inevitably reflect
changing political currents. 4 In light of recent political upheav-
als in Congress, the present policy of strict antitrust enforcement
may be altered by the end of 1996. However, the Justice Depart-
ment's intention to scrutinize the conditions surrounding exclusive
dealing arrangements more closely than it has in recent years,
utilizing both a doctrinal and a factual analysis,1 5 represents the
proper approach to judicial analysis of exclusive dealing. Although
courts are not bound by the Department's enforcement policy, the
Eastman Kodak decision suggests that courts too should begin to
analyze exclusive dealing carefully.
IV. EXCLUSIVE DEALING IN THE COMPUTERIZED TICKET
DISTRIBUTION INDUSTRY
Courts must carefully examine the numerous factors articulat-
ed in the Supreme Court's decisions and in subsequent lower court
cases when evaluating the legality of exclusive dealing arrange-
ments. In analyzing these factors, they should conduct rigorous
factual inquiries into market conditions and responses, and they
should refuse to proceed on assumptions based purely on econom-
ic theory. In order to undertake the proper balancing required by
the rule of reason, courts must vigilantly require factual predicates
before imposing or dismissing antitrust liability.
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1993) (statement
of Anne K. Bingaman). Bingaman further emphasized that "every case is unique, every
market is unique . . .the set of companies and facts are the lifeblood of antitrust." Id.
112. Remarks of Asst. Attorney Gen. Anne K. Bingaman to the ABA Antitrust Sec-
tion, New York, NY, in 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,110 (Aug. 10, 1993).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Fajer, supra note 92, at 8 (noting that the Justice Department brought
no legal challenges to vertical restraints during the Reagan and Bush administrations, re-
flecting a skepticism that such restraints ever could result in competitive harm.); Festa,
supra, note 76, at 622 (describing President Ronald Reagan's election and his subsequent
appointments to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and to the judiciary
as events that magnified the Chicago School's effect on antitrust jurisprudence).
115. See Text of Bingaman's Address to ABA's Antitrust Section, in 65 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 250 (Aug. 12, 1993).
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A. Market Definition
Careful definition of the relevant market is crucial to the
application of the rule of reason in exclusive dealing arrangements.
Indeed, the assessment of the relevant market frequently deter-
mines the outcome of a case."6 The Supreme Court has identi-
fied accurate market definition as the "prime factor" in determin-
ing whether an exclusivity agreement effectively forecloses compe-
tition in the relevant "line of commerce."" 7 Market definition,
however, is not undertaken as an end in itself. It serves only as an
analytical framework for identifying the unlawful exercise of mar-
ket power."'
The relevant market is "the area of effective competition"
within which the defendant conducts business."9 Market defini-
tion generally consists of two components: the product market,
which describes the product or service involved, and the geograph-
ic market, which describes the geographic area in which the defen-
dant operates."2 With respect to each component, the less ex-
pansive the market definition, the more likely a plaintiff will pre-
vail on an antitrust claim.'2'
One method of defining the relevant product market is in
terms of possible substitutes for the antitrust defendant's product
or service."2 In these terms, the market consists of the product
or service of the firm as well as those products or services viewed
as close substitutes by buyers."z The Justice Department mea-
sures the appropriate market by determining what effects would
result if a hypothetical monopolist of a given product or service
imposed a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in
116. James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated Products: The Need for a
Workable Standard, 63 ANTTRUST L.J. 697, 697 (1995).
117. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961).
118. See Keyte, supra note 116 at 697.
119. Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 328.
120. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
121. The Justice Department has examined the relevant market in terms of groups of
products and services in which a firm employing a particular restraint could exercise
market power effectively. See U.S. Dep't of Justice and FTC Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 [hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines]. When the identified
market is limited in expanse, a demonstration of a high concentration of market power is
easier to make.
122. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 379-81
(1957); Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 297.
123. See E.L Du Pont, 351 U.S. at 393.
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price. 24 When the price increase would not be profitable because
buyers would shift to other products, they add the product or
service that is the "next best substitute," taking into account the
effects of the exclusive dealing arrangement. They then make the
same inquiry again until one group of products is identified for
which a monopolist's price increase would be profitable."z
The ticket distribution industry presents several alternative
market definitions. Antitrust defendants generally attempt to de-
fine the market broadly, diminishing the appearance of sizeable
foreclosure or market power. One plausible product market defini-
tion in the ticketing context would incorporate the retail sale of all
entertainment tickets in a given geographic area. This would in-
clude numerous small, regional venues that do not deal in the
large-scale distribution of tickets, but rather sell tickets to enter-
tainment events only through their own box offices.1" Under this
definition, the possibility that a single firm's exclusive contracts
might effectively foreclose a substantial share of the retail sale of
all entertainment events is not very great.12z
However, the purpose of defining the relevant market is an
important consideration. When choosing between alternative mar-
ket definitions, courts should ask, "What is the antitrust question
in this case that market definition aims to answer?"'" In the
present context, market definition is intended to determine wheth-
er competition has been foreclosed unreasonably such that other
firms within the same market do not have the ability to keep the
dominant firm from raising prices to supracompetitive levels.'29
With this purpose in mind, the relevant market is defined more
plausibly as off-site ticket sales in major metropolitan areas.
124. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41,554.
125. 1& at 41,555.
126. See Stem, supra note 20, at 374-75.
127. In fact, Fred Rosen, the president of Ticketmaster, testified before Congress that
Ticketmaster accounted for only 2% of the 1.5 billion tickets sold to entertainment
events nationwide. See Ramirez, supra note 25, at Ci. The New York Times reports,
however, that two-thirds of this figure consists of tickets for museums, amusement parks,
county fairs, and other events. In contrast, Ticketmaster, according to the Times, holds
37% of the market for tickets to major concerts and sporting events. IdL In a regional
market, this percentage could be significantly higher. See infra note 141 and accompany-
ing text.
128. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 598 (1993).
129. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (noting that the
relevant market should include the products or services to which "customers may
turn . . . if there is a slight increase in the price of the main product [or service]").
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Ticket distribution companies such as Ticketmaster are in
direct competition not with the venue's box office ticket sales, 3°
but with other distribution companies of its kind. The threatened
danger to competition is not that a venue, which has already con-
tracted with a ticket distribution company to sell its tickets, will
face decreased sales at its own box office; rather, the danger is
that another ticketing service company is denied the opportunity
to compete for its own contract to sell tickets for that venue.
Moreover, Ticketmaster, in many situations, not only enjoys
the exclusive right to sell tickets at retail outlets and over the
phone, but also limits the number of hours that the venue box
office remains open and the number of tickets that the box office
may sell.' Finally, a very large percentage of tickets for major
concerts are sold at outlets or over the telephone; tickets for espe-
cially popular entertainment events sometimes sell out in only
minutes, with Ticketmaster selling essentially every available ticket.
Because a venue's sale of tickets at the box office does not com-
pete directly with Ticketmaster and cannot preclude Ticketmaster
from exercising market power and raising its prices on the sale of
tickets, box office sales should not be considered part of the rele-
vant market.
Including ticket sales to all entertainment events, no matter
how large or small, in the relevant market, would similarly distort
the requisite examination of Ticketmaster's exercise of market
power. Off-site ticket sales to large entertainment events conceded-
ly constitute only a narrow segment of ticket sales to all entertain-
ment events, and excludes countless small, independent entertain-
ment venues that distribute tickets only through their own box
offices. 32 However, the purpose of Ticketmaster's exclusivity
contracts with venues and promoters is to exercise control over the
computerized distribution of tickets, not the retail sale of all enter-
tainment tickets. 33 Within the computerized ticket service mar-
ket, exclusive dealing arrangements provide Ticketmaster with the
means to exercise power over price, and consequently, to increase
service charges substantially.
130. See Stem, supra note 20, at 375.
131. Id. at 354.
132. Id. at 374-75.
133. Id. at 375.
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An analogous situation arose in Twin City Sportservice v.
Charles 0. Finley & Co.,l 4 a case in which an owner of a base-
ball club alleged antitrust violations against a concessionaire who
held an exclusive concession franchise contract for events at the
baseball stadium. Supporting the trial court's narrowing of the
relevant market definition, the Ninth Circuit reasoned:
The district court found that effective competition existed only
for concession franchises that a national concessionaire would
find profitable by reason of dollar volumes. The record amply
supports the district court's finding that effective competition did
not encompass every concession franchise within the relevant line
of commerce.1 35
The Ninth Circuit's opinion supports the argument that neither
small, independent venue box offices nor small-scale ticket distrib-
utors for minor entertainment events are relevant to a determina-
tion of the competitive atmosphere of the computerized ticketing
service industry. Therefore, in order to assess the ability of other
ticketing service companies to compete with Ticketmaster, the
product market should be defined restrictively.
The next step in product market definition is an interchange-
ability inquiry, or an inquiry into whether or not any acceptable
substitute for the product or service exists. 1' Utilizing the Justice
Department's test,137 if Ticketmaster imposed a small but signifi-
cant increase in its service charges, those products to which con-
sumers would then shift should be included in the relevant market.
The structure of the ticket distribution industry, however, does not
provide any alternative to consumers who are unhappy with price
increases. Venue box offices are the only possible option, but they
fail to provide an adequate alternative for several reasons. First,
134. 676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982).
135. Id. at 1300 (emphasis added).
136. The most relevant factor in this determination is the cross-elasticity of demand
faced by the defendant, or the degree to which the defendant's sales fall as its price rises
and consumers choose competitors' products as substitutes. When cross-elasticity of two
products is high, (i.e., when consumers change their consumption of one product in re-
sponse to a change in the price of another at a high rate), the two products should be
included in the same market. Although the Supreme Court has ruled that "reasonable
interchangeability" and cross-elasticity of demand determine the "outer boundaries" of the
product market, it has provided little guidance on the degree of cross-elasticity required.
See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); Keyte, supra note 116,
at 699.
137. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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venue box office sales lack the convenience of computer ticketing
sales, which often take place over the telephone or in a ticket
outlet that may be easily accessible to the consumer. Second, even
if a ticketing company has not reserved the right to distribute
tickets from the box office, it frequently sells all available tickets
for popular events over the telephone.138 Because Ticketmaster
controls exclusive contracts with a majority of venues and promot-
ers nationwide, consumers are forced to either buy tickets through
Ticketmaster or not attend these events. As one commentator rea-
soned, "If venue box offices are part of the relevant product mar-
ket, one would expect to see consumers increasingly purchasing
their tickets at the box office with every increase in ... service
charges. However, this is clearly not the case.', 139 The relevant
market, therefore, should be defined to include only off-site ticket
sales.
The definition of the relevant geographic market is similar to
the definition of the product market."4 The Supreme Court has
pointed out that "Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual ap-
proach to the definition of the relevant market and not a formal,
legalistic one. The geographic market selected must, therefore,
both 'correspond to the commercial realities' of the industry and
be economically significant."'' This rationale suggests that the
unique structure of the ticketing service industry must be consid-
ered carefully in determining the appropriate geographical market
definition.
The relevant geographic market is the "area in which the
seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for
supplies [or services]."' 42 Venues and promoters operate on a lo-
cal level; when they compete among themselves for the opportuni-
ty to host entertainment events, they do so only on a regional
basis, suggesting that the effective area of competition for ticketing
services is local. For example, a large venue in New York City
does not affect the operations of a comparably sized venue in Los
Angeles. Ticketmaster's contract with the Los Angeles venue simi-
138. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
139. See Stem, supra note 20, at 376 n.194.
140. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 336 ("The criteria to be used in determining the
appropriate geographic market are essentially similar to those used to determine the
relevant product market.").
141. Id. at 336-37.
142. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
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larly has no effect on its contract with the New York venue.
Therefore, although Ticketmaster is a national enterprise, the
geographic market in which venues and promoters contract for
Ticketmaster's services is local. Indeed, the very existence of
regional ticket distributors that are unable to compete with
Ticketmaster on a national basis but that may succeed in contract-
ing with smaller venues at a local level suggests that the relevant
market is local.
B. Foreclosure
Once a court has identified the relevant market, it must then
calculate the degree of foreclosure within that market in order to
evaluate the legality of any exclusive dealing arrangement.144 The
presence or absence of proof that the relevant market is in fact
being foreclosed may indeed determine the outcome of a case.' 45
However, analyzing the degree of foreclosure in a particular mar-
ket is not a straightforward task. Courts must first determine the
degree of foreclosure that is sufficient to constitute an antitrust
violation.
While courts have not applied strict threshold percentage
requirements for a finding of illegality, some trends have emerged.
Generally, when less than 10% of the relevant market has been
foreclosed, no violation is found."4 The rationale for this result
143. Given the purpose of market definition-determining the existence of market
power-the selection of a local market makes sense. This is illustrated by one
commentator's analysis of Ticketmaster's control over the Northern and Southern Califor-
nia markets. Stem, supra note 20, at 355-56. In Northern California, BASS, a regional
ticketing company, entered into a licensing agreement that allowed BASS to use
Ticketmaster's computer systems and its name in advertising. At the same time, BASS
agreed not to compete with Ticketmaster in the Southern California market. Id. at 355.
BASS had a 75% share of the off-site ticketing market in Northern California, and
Ticketmaster maintained a 95% share of San Diego's off-site ticketing market. Id. at
376-77. These facts indicate that a local market definition demonstrates when a company
has accumulated sufficient market power to exercise control over price, and therefore
constitutes the proper geographic market.
144. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993)
("In any event, under Tampa [Electric] the ultimate issue in exclusivity cases remains the
issue of foreclosure and its consequences.").
145. See Richard M. Steuer, Vertical Restraints in the Nineties, 62 ANTIrRusT .. 717,
724 (1994).
146. See, e.g., In re Beltone Electronics Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 184 (1982) (holding
7-8% foreclosure not sufficient to find violation); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823
F.2d 1215, 1234 (8th Cir. 1987) (8-10% not sufficient), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988);
see also Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6,263, 6,269
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is that such an insignificant amount is not likely to have any
anticompetitive effects. Conversely, when an obviously large por-
tion of the market is foreclosed by exclusivity agreements, courts
have found that anticompetitive effects are likely. Specifically, the
cases indicate that foreclosure may be sufficient when it is greater
than 50%.147
More problematic is a foreclosure percentage that falls be-
tween these percentages. Historically, courts addressing market
foreclosure between 10% and 50% have ruled inconsistently."4
However, the Jefferson Parish decision, in which Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion found a 30% foreclosure insuffi-
cient, may be an indication that courts will begin to apply a higher
threshold requirement.'49 Subsequent cases have, in fact, found
percentages up to 40% lawful.' Even with these general thresh-
olds in mind, however, courts must make any determination of
market foreclosure by looking to actual competitive effects."
The First Circuit has interpreted Tampa Electric to mean that
not only foreclosure but also its consequences are the "ultimate
issue" in exclusive dealing cases. 52 The percentage of the market
tied up with exclusive dealing contracts, then, does not in itself
indicate whether or not the foreclosure is illegal. In measuring
foreclosure, both the percentage of the market tied up and the
(1985) [hereinafter Vertical Restraints Guidelines] (safe harbor for 10% or less).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 758 F.2d 654 (6th Cir.) (finding 50%
foreclosure sufficient to impose liability), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985); Oltz v. St.
Peter's Community Hosp., 656 F. Supp. 760, 763 (D. Mont. 1987) (84% sufficient), affd,
861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988); Kohler Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 1986-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 67,047, at 62,416 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (62% sufficient).
148. See, e.g., Twin City Sportservice v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1298
(9th Cir.) (long-term foreclosure of 24% of market unlawful), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009
(1982); American Motor Inns v. Holiday Inns, 521 F.2d 1230, 1252 (3rd Cir. 1975) (15%
insufficient to establish liability); Servicetrends v. Siemens Medical Sys., 870 F. Supp.
1042, 1065 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (32-38% market foreclosure not per se legal).
149. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 46-47 (1984).
150. See, &g., Sewell Plastics, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 720 F. Supp. 1196, 1212-14
(W.D.N.C. 1989) (40% insufficient to impose liability), affd in part, 912 F.2d 463 (4th
Cir. 1990); Gonzalez v. Insignares, 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,701, at 63,335 (N.D.
Ga. 1985) (40% insufficient). But see Servicetrends, 870 F. Supp. at 1065 (32-38% not per
se legal).
151. See In re Beltone Electronics, Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 217-18 (1982). The Commis-
sion, while finding in favor of the defendant, nevertheless refused to find clearly lawful
the foreclosure of 16% of market sales, or 7-8% of dealers. The Commission emphasized
qualitative standards and looked for an adverse effect on interbrand competition.
152. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993).
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practical effect of binding that percentage of the market to ex-
clusive contracts are essential factors.153 For example, foreclosure
is more damaging to competition when the defendant has a large
market share," when the industry is concentrated,.5 and when
no alternative means of distribution are available.156
Analysis of market foreclosure in the computerized ticket
distribution industry is complicated by the infrastructure of the
industry. "When an exclusive dealing arrangement involves an end-
user, the foreclosure effect is straightforward; sales to the end-user
are foreclosed .... When distributors are involved, however, this
kind of one-to-one analysis is not reliable." 57 Therefore, the
most accurate determination of foreclosure will result from an
examination of the extent to which competing ticketing service
companies are foreclosed from reaching the ultimate market-the
consumers of the product. 58 Any meaningful analysis thus must
contemplate the obstacles that Ticketmaster has created in keeping
actual and potential competitors from reaching the ultimate con-
sumer.
The extent to which Ticketmaster's exclusive dealing contracts
have tied up the market is the subject of ongoing dispute. The
New York Times has reported that Ticketmaster has exclusive
rights to almost two-thirds of the nation's ten million seats at
major halls. 9 Another report states that Ticketmaster has exclu-
sive contracts with sites holding 45% of the nation's seats.' 6' Ei-
ther of these amounts is likely to have an adverse effect on com-
petition and fall within the general parameters discussed above for
determining whether the quantitative standard is sufficient; and
judging from the absence of significant competitors in the relevant
market, these amounts already appear to have affected competition
adversely.
By removing venues and promoters from the reach of new
ticket distribution companies, the exclusive dealing contracts seem-
ingly impair the ability of actual or potential competitors of
153. See id.
154. See Strasser, supra note 12, at 985.
155. Id. at 985-86.
156. See Steuer, supra note 145, at 937-38.
157. See id. at 931.
158. See i
159. See Ramirez, supra note 25.
160. Id.
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Ticketmaster to operate.' No significant competitor has entered
the market since Ticketmaster's acquisition of Ticketron in
1991.162 Moreover, new venues capable of holding large-scale en-
tertainment events seldom emerge, and existing venues are avail-
able for new contracts only infrequently. 163 These facts indicate
substantial foreclosure with probable immediate anticompetitive ef-
fects-the essential basis for an attack on an exclusivity con-
tract.' 6
The impact of foreclosure in this industry is apparent. Not
only have existing competitors been driven from the market, but
new competitors also have failed to enter the market. Moreover,
Ticketmaster has raised its service charges on tickets to exorbitant
amounts, thus directly injuring the consumer. 5 At the same
time, the foreclosure effects have left consumers without an alter-
native to paying these inflated prices. These results belie any theo-
retical argument that foreclosure as a result of exclusive dealing
never can occur.
16
C. Ease of Entry
The Federal Trade Commission in Beltone Electronics Corpo-
ration67 described how exclusive dealing arrangements can erect
barriers to entry: "We are concerned primarily with restraints that
may increase the costs of entry and reduce opportunities for new
entrants to distribute their products [or to obtain suppliers], mak-
ing it more difficult to open up less-than-competitive markets."'"
161. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993)
(undertaking similar analysis in determining possible impact of exclusive contracts between
HMO and physicians).
162. See Stem, supra note 20, at 11
163. See U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 596 (noting that continual entrance into the
market by new doctors with immediate need for patients served as indicator that foreclo-
sure did not impair the ability of new HMOs to operate). With exclusive contracts gener-
ally lasting three to five years, one-third to one-fifth of the market would open annually;
this, however, is not necessarily sufficient to relieve the clog on competition that such
exclusivity creates. See infra text accompanying notes 180-89.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 180-89.
165. See Stem, supra note 20, at 354-55.
166. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
167. 100 F.T.C. 68 (1982).
168. Id. This case deals with distributor exclusivity; for purposes of this Note, howev-
er, distributor exclusivity may be analyzed under the same principles as supplier exclusiv-
ity. See supra note 27.
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Some commentators would ignore the impact of entry barriers
altogether in antitrust analysis.'69 The better view, however, rec-
ognizes that entry barriers effectively can create unreasonable re-
straints on competition. Barriers erected by the exclusive dealing
arrangements in the ticketing service industry must be analyzed
with a view toward actual competitive effects.
The relevant inquiry, then, is whether and to what extent the
foreclosure created by exclusive dealing raises barriers to en-
try.7 ° Several barriers to entry exist in the ticketing distribution
industry. First, existing competitors have been forced to seek new
venues and promoters; the lack of large-scale competitors indicates
that these companies have either shifted to smaller-scale venues in
order to procure distribution contracts or abandoned the market
entirely. Second, potential competitors face the difficult task of
attracting venues and promoters that have dealt with Ticketmaster
extensively over a long period of time.' Moreover, Ticket-
master's practice of providing dealers and promoters with addition-
al financial incentives-in the form of percentages of service charg-
es paid by consumers-to enter into exclusive dealing contracts has
lured suppliers away from other distributors and discourages po-
tential competitors from attempting to enter the market. Exclusive
dealing therefore appears to have created severe barriers to entry
into the market.
Theoretically, Ticketmaster's conduct can be justified as pursu-
ing legitimate business practices, and any resulting entry barriers
may be characterized simply as the natural, reasonable results of
such practices. Potential competitors will find entry difficult simply
because Ticketmaster is efficient, has created significant economies
of scale, and possesses valuable computer and communications
equipment, a sturdy reputation, and greater experience in the
industry. Arguably, these entry barriers are inherent in the nature
of competition. 72 However, the barriers Ticketmaster has created
169. "[I]t is demonstrable that barriers of the sort these commentators and jurists
believe they see do not exist. They are ghosts that inhabit antitrust theory." BORK, supra
note 7, at 310.
170. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 184.
171. The complaint in a recently filed suit, MovieFone, Inc. v. Ticketmaster Corp.,
alleges that "[b]arriers to entry into teleticketing for [popular live events that the industry
expects will sell out] are high because experience, reputation for reliability, and substan.
tial specialized computer/communication capability are necessary." reprinted in 68 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 449, 449 (Apr. 6, 1995).
172. See BORK, supra note 7, at 311.
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in enforcing its exclusive dealing contracts appear to be, in Robert
Bork's terms, "artificial clogs upon competition" that are "not
forms of superior efficiency,' 7 3 and hence, undeserving of pro-
tection from antitrust liability. 74 Ticketmaster creates artificial
barriers to entry through the very terms of its exclusive dealing
contracts. By providing financial incentives to venues and promot-
ers without cost justifications, Ticketmaster maintains exclusivity
arrangements and artificially bars entry without engaging in any
efficiency-enhancing conduct. Moreover, one complainant has al-
leged that the corporation engages in economically irrational con-
duct, enforcing its contracts to the extent that it sacrifices short-
term profits to further exclusionary goals.'75
Lower courts that have addressed ease of entry into the mar-
ket also note that high entry barriers are indications that incum-
bent firms will exploit their market power and raise prices above
the competitive level. 76 Conversely, when a firm actually raises
prices significantly and no new entry appears, this result signals
that entry barriers are currently in place. Ticketmaster has raised
its prices repeatedly in the absence of threats from any other
competitors. 7 The Federal Trade Commission also has recog-
nized that one important factor in analyzing anticompetitive effects
is the actual entry of other competitors into the market.7 The
173. Id.
174. Under this analysis, even a Chicago School legal theorist may be inclined to view
Ticketmaster's exclusive contracts as violations of the Sherman Act. See supra notes 7-10
and accompanying text.
175. The complaint filed against Ticketmaster by the band Pearl Jam alleges that the
corporation organized a group boycott against the group when it sought to distribute its
own tickets for concerts at venues with which Ticketmaster had exclusive contracts. The
complaint argues:
Ticketmaster's insistence that promoters strictly abide by the exclusivity provi-
sions in their agreements has effectively frozen Pearl Jam out of distributing
tickets to its own concerts .... [Ticketmaster's economically irrational actions
are] demonstrated by Ticketmaster's position-reported in the March 25, 1994
memorandum by NACPA's executive director-that .... Ticketmaster is willing
to forego the profits it would earn by distributing a portion of tickets to [the]
concerts in order to discipline Pearl Jam and nip in the bud what it fears might
become the widespread use of alternative means of distributing tickets by other
performers.
Memorandum from Pearl Jam to the Antitrust Div. of the U. S. Dep't of Justice Con-
cerning Anticompetitive Actions Engaged in by Ticketmaster Holdings Group Ltd. 12
(May 6, 1994) (on file with author).
176. See Interface Group, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1987).
177. See Stern, supra note 20, at 350, 377.
178. See In re Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 210.
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Federal Trade Commission analyzed ease of entry into the rele-
vant market in Beltone: "[Other] firms have recently entered the
market or grown vigorously, in part at the expense of the older
firms. The new entrants have experienced little difficulty in finding
[suppliers or] distributors.' ' 179 No similar entry by computer tick-
eting companies with Ticketmaster's capability to have an impact
on national or regional markets has occurred, indicating that the
exclusive contracts have erected high entry barriers that potential
competitors have not been able to overcome.
D. Duration
The duration of the contracts is an important factor in assess-
ing the foreclosure effects of exclusivity. Exclusivity contracts with
short terms and specific provisions for short notice of termination
generally are presumed to be lawful."is The rationale for this po-
sition is that when contracts are either short-term or terminable on
short notice, vigorous competition for the contracts emerges when
contracts expire and terms must be renegotiated. Longer contracts
are more likely to tie up the market for unreasonable periods,
making it difficult for actual or potential competitors to secure the
suppliers needed to compete effectively.18 1
The Justice Department has identified the potential dangers of
long-term exclusive contracts:
In general, the longer the term of a vertical restraint (especially
if such a term cannot be justified by the need to encourage in-
vestment) the more likely it is that the restraint is exclu-
sionary .. .. [A]n exclusionary effect is more likely where large
suppliers' [or distributors'] exclusive dealing contracts have very
long terms and assess major financial penalties against dealers
who change suppliers [or distributors].1"
179. Id.
180. Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir.
1984) (noting that contracts terminable in less than one year are presumed to be lawful).
181. See Twin City Sportservice v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1304 (9th
Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982). The court found that the magnitude and con-
siderable length of the defendants' exclusive contracts had a detrimental effect on compe-
tition: "[Tihey have locked up a large portion of the concession franchise market for
many years, placing a significant amount of potential concession business beyond the
grasp of any competitors." Id. The court further noted that the length of the contracts
was unnecessary to recapture investments made in the contracts. Id.
182. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6,263, 6,271; see also U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993) (recognizing that
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No standard rule dictates how long a contract term may endure
legally or how long a termination requirement is permissible; in-
stead, courts examine the surrounding business environment, and
consequently, the actual effect the contracts have on competition.
"[l]t is the totality of reasons for such a term, and its actual im-
pact on competition, that are decisive."' 3 Of course, the longer
the term of an exclusive contract, the more closely courts and law
enforcement agencies should scrutinize it.
Ticketmaster's contracts reportedly have terms of three to five
years."8 These terms are substantial; courts have invalidated ex-
clusive contracts with lesser duration requirements.'85 Ticket-
master might argue that the expense of securing the contracts and
their capital investment in the business requires longer terms for
the contracts. However, these business justifications are not per-
suasive in light of the contracts' severe anticompetitive effects. The
absence of any effective competitors in the industry is evidence
that the long-term nature of the contracts has contributed to an
"actual, not potential 'clog' on competition." '16 No evidence sug-
gests that shorter-term contracts would not protect Ticketmaster's
investment to an equal degree while restraining competition to a
lesser extent.
Terminability of contracts is also a factor in evaluating the
reasonableness of exclusive dealing arrangements. Theoretically,
contracts that are easily terminated present less of a threat to
effective competition. Some courts have found exclusive contracts
terminable in less than a year to be presumptively lawful." 7
However, the First Circuit has ruled that terminability, even when
even a contract terminable on 30 days notice may have anticompetitive effects if a reim-
bursement penalty were imposed on doctors who moved from exclusive to nonexclusive
status).
183. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 998 F.2d 1073, 1080 (1st Cir. 1993).
184. See Stern, supra note 20, at 353; see also supra note 25.
185. See, eg., L. G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 23 (1971) (upholding the Federal
Trade Commission's order invalidating 3-year exclusive dealing contracts with high schools
as anticompetitive and unfair methods of competition); Zap Professional Photography, Inc.
v. McCluney, 663 So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1995) (applying state antitrust laws to declare exclu-
sive dealing contracts to be unlawful exercise of monopoly power and restricting
company's two-year exclusive dealing contracts to one-year terms) (citing United States v.
Gninnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)).
186. Stern, supra note 20, at 377.
187. See, e.g., Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395
(7th Cir. 1984).
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possible with short notice, will not reverse anticompetitive results
in the market." s In U.S. Healthcare, the First Circuit noted that
even a thirty-day terminability clause could have the effect of
frustrating a competitor's efforts to have access to the services of
doctors that are essential to the function of the competitors' busi-
ness.18 9 Therefore, even if Ticketmaster's contracts permit termi-
nation on relatively short notice, the contracts are not necessarily
lawful.
E. The Final Analysis
If courts closely scrutinize each of these factors in the context
of the computerized ticketing industry, they should conclude that
exclusive dealing has harmed competition and that public interven-
tion is required to halt current unlawful business practices. The ex-
clusive dealing arrangements undertaken by Ticketmaster and con-
tracting venues and promoters foreclose a substantial portion of
the relevant market by imposing excessive duration terms and
creating significant artificial barriers to entry. Neither potential nor
actual competitors have succeeded in dissipating Ticketmaster's
market power, and the practical results are evident: Consumers
have been forced to pay inflated prices for tickets to entertainment
events. The complete failure of market forces themselves to cure
any anticompetitive effects requires that the law intervene and
restore healthy competition to the industry.
Ignoring the practical effects and applying strict economic
theory, however, would allow a court or enforcement agency to
overlook these severe anticompetitive effects. Theoretically, for
example, Ticketmaster's exclusive dealing contracts serve primarily
as a means to a legitimate business end: reduction of costs through
the creation of scale economies, decreased transaction costs, and
the elimination of free riders. In reducing its costs, Ticketmaster
should be able to operate more efficiently and distribute tickets to
the ultimate consumer at a lower charge. In reality, however,
Ticketmaster consistently has raised the service charges it adds to
the price of a ticket. One would expect this sharp increase in
prices to encourage new entry into the industry; new entrants
could price slightly below Ticketmaster's prices and still make a
188. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993).
189. Id.
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substantial profit. Yet no new competitors have emerged because
Ticketmaster's strict enforcement of its exclusivity agreements and
the long-term nature of the contracts tie up existing venues and
promoters and deny new competitors the essential supply that they
need to operate. In the final analysis, Ticketmaster's proffered
business justifications are weak, if not entirely misleading.
In the absence of legal intervention, Ticketmaster will contin-
ue to eliminate actual and potential competitors from the industry
and to raise service charges for the consumer, with no check on
the exercise of its market power. This result indicates that in order
to further the goals of antitrust law, courts must scrutinize the
competitive effects of exclusive dealing closely in any situation in
which a dominant firm utilizes long-term exclusive dealing con-
tracts, market foreclosure appears to be substantial, and
anticompetitive effects are the likely result.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust is by no means a static area of law. Instead, it con-
tinuously evolves in correlation with changing social and political
views. This result cannot be avoided; antitrust law is grounded in a
number of competing and ever-changing forces, including economic
theory, social policy, political pressures, and judicial sentiment. At
any given moment, therefore, predicting the next direction antitrust
law will follow proves to be a difficult task.
The 1980s marked an era of few civil antitrust cases filed by
the government, and fewer verdicts against antitrust defen-
dants."9 This result was dependent on a number of factors, in-
cluding the emergence of the "new economic learning," the influ-
ence of powerful interest groups, and lower funding and staffing of
the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice. The 1990s, however, have witnessed a
change in policy. The Department of Justice has announced its
intention to investigate and ultimately prosecute companies whose
business practices violate the antitrust laws.'9' Moreover, both
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission will
place a particular emphasis on investigating vertical restraint cas-
190. See Donald L. Flexner & Mark A. Racanelli, State and Federal Antitrust Enforce-
ment in the United States: Collision or Harmony?, 9 CONN. J. INT'L LAW 501, 508 (1994).
191. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
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es,"n which have been treated leniently in previous years. The
Supreme Court as well has indicated its willingness to deal with
vertical restraint cases in a more meaningful manner.93
This new trend indicates that companies that have no major
rivals and control a large percentage of the market will be scruti-
nized carefully both by public enforcement agencies and by the
judiciary. Companies charged with antitrust violations should not,
and hopefully will not, succeed simply by asserting a defense based
on economic theory and not grounded in economic fact. For domi-
nant incumbent firms, simple recitation of the potential procom-
petitive effects of exclusivity arrangements should no longer pro-
vide insulation from enforcement of the antitrust laws. Careful
scrutiny of exclusive dealing will serve both the letter and the
spirit of the federal antitrust laws.
192. See Withdrawal of Vertical Guidelines Is Discussed as Positive Step for Law, News
& Comment, 65, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 434, 435 (1993) ("Finding vertical
cases is a priority of the [FTC's Bureau of Competition].... revocation of the [DOJ's
Vertical Restraint Guidelines] will 'make it easier for us' to find them.").
193. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
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